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Abstract Smartphones’ cameras, microphones, and
device displays enable users to capture and view memo-
rable moments of their lives. However, adversaries can
trick users into authorizing malicious apps that exploit
weaknesses in current mobile platforms to misuse such
on-board I/O devices to stealthily capture photos, videos,
and screen content without the users’ consent. Contem-
porary mobile operating systems fail to prevent such mis-
use of I/O devices by authorized apps due to lack of bind-
ing between users’ interactions and accesses to I/O de-
vices performed by these apps. In this paper, we pro-
pose Aware, a security framework for authorizing app
requests to perform operations using I/O devices, which
binds app requests with user intentions to make all uses
of certain I/O devices explicit. We evaluate our defense
mechanisms through laboratory-based experimentation
and a user study, involving 74 human subjects, whose
ability to identify undesired operations targeting I/O de-
vices increased significantly. Without Aware, only 18%
of the participants were able to identify attacks from
tested RAT apps. Aware systematically blocks all the
attacks in absence of user consent and supports users
in identifying 82% of social-engineering attacks tested
to hijack approved requests, including some more so-
phisticated forms of social engineering not yet present
in available RATs. Aware introduces only 4.79% max-
imum performance overhead over operations targeting
I/O devices. Aware shows that a combination of system
defenses and user interface can significantly strengthen
defenses for controlling the use of on-board I/O devices.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, mobile platforms are equipped with cameras,
microphones and wide screens, which enable a variety
of popular functions, ranging from audio/video record-
ing to displaying information to users. Many apps now
utilize these functions to provide services that leverage
on-board Input/Output (I/O) devices. For example, many
apps now support voice and video messages, as well as
photo/video shooting and editing. Even insurance or
banking apps now utilize mobile platforms’ cameras to
collect sensitive information to expedite claim process-
ing or check depositing [15, 17]. Apps able to record the
screen content are also available for remote screen shar-
ing or tutorial editing.
However, uncontrolled access to on-board I/O devices
can enable malicious apps, with access to these devices,
to exfiltrate sensitive information. Adversaries have built
malware apps, referred to as Remote Access Trojans
(RATs), that abuse authorized access to such devices to
extract audio, video, screen content, and more, from mo-
bile platforms, such as smartphones and tablets. Mal-
ware in the wild both surreptitiously records data from
a variety of mobile devices [3, 1, 13], but also performs
directed attacks, such as constructing three-dimensional
models of indoor environments [22] and extracting credit
card numbers and PIN numbers [23] from screenshots
or keyboards’ tones. Furthermore, uncontrolled accesses
to on-board cameras and microphone can become sen-
sitive if apps can stealthily take photos or videos and
record audio by running a service in background1. Addi-
tionally, RAT apps can also use social-engineering tech-
niques [16] to hijack user-requested activities, such as
showing a soft-button on screen that supposedly allows
the user to take a picture when in reality the user action
will trigger voice recording instead through the smart-
phone’s microphone.
Current defenses do not prevent malicious apps that
happen to be granted access to I/O devices from ex-
filtrating sensitive data. Android, iOS, and Windows
Phone OS all require users to authorize apps for access
to I/O devices, such as the camera and microphone, at
install time or at first use. In many cases, users may
assume that the use of such devices will be important,
if not fundamental, for the effective operation of such
apps. Should the user authorize an app, the app can
175% of operations requiring permissions are performed when the
screen is off or apps are running in background as services [36]
then choose when to use the device. In addition, ac-
cess to screen content is not even mediated by any of
the mobile operating systems. More restrictive security
models, such as SE Android [29], cannot control apps
access to such devices further, as they mainly protect
the lower level Android system. Some research systems
aim to prevent unauthorized access to resources, such as
these devices, by empowering apps to assist in the deci-
sion making [25, 30, 31]. However, since apps may be
malicious, attacks cannot be prevented by this method.
Alternatively, researchers have explored auditing the use
of such devices [34] and providing visible indication of
app behaviors [28], but the former only detects attacks
retroactively after the data has been exfiltrated, whereas
user notification alone requires users to pay attention to
each operation’s security status, continuously, to avoid
missing attacks.
In this work, we propose the Aware framework for au-
thorizing app requests to perform operations using I/O
devices, which binds app requests with user intentions
to make all uses of I/O devices explicit. To do this, we
take the following steps. First, app requests for oper-
ations using I/O devices are intercepted by the Aware-
enabled services to mediate all security-sensitive oper-
ations. Second, Aware makes each app request visible
to the user, independently from the app, to enable users
to express their intents without being spoofed. Third,
Aware makes ongoing operations, targeting I/O devices,
visible to users, so they may choose to terminate the op-
eration. As opposed to previous solutions, Aware does
not depend on apps to govern users, but rather Aware
links app requests and user input. Also, Aware maintains
the security status of ongoing operations, so user actions
are only necessary at operation initiation and completion,
rather than requiring ongoing user monitoring [28].
We have implemented Aware on Android OS
(android-6.0.1 r5 version) and found it to perform effec-
tively, by adding a maximum overhead of 4.79% (mini-
mum 2.19%). We have performed a user study, involv-
ing 74 human subject. Without Aware, only 18% of
the study participants were able to identify attacks from
tested RAT apps. Aware systematically blocks all the at-
tacks in absence of user consent and enabled study par-
ticipants to identify 82% of social-engineering attacks
tested to hijack approved requests, including some more
sophisticated forms of social engineering not yet present
in available RATs. This paper makes the following con-
tributions:
• We reverse-engineer two real-world RAT apps and
two proof-of-concept RAT apps to systematically
study and categorize the different techniques used
by adversaries in mounting attacks targeting on-
board I/O devices. We identify five security prop-
erties that must be satisfied in order to ensure pro-
tection against stealthy operations from malicious
apps targeting on-board I/O devices.
• We propose Aware, a security framework, that in-
troduces defense mechanisms for enforcing these
five security properties by mediating app requests
to I/O devices and matching those requests to user
consent, which blocks all unapproved requests and
maintains the security status of ongoing requests to
the user to enable prevention of social-engineering
attacks.
• We conduct an extensive user study involving 74
human subjects to evaluate: (1) users’ awareness
of RAT attacks targeting I/O devices, (2) effective-
ness of RAT attacks targeting on-board I/O devices,
and (3) effectiveness of our proposed defense mech-
anisms in increasing users’ awareness and control
over sensitive operations targeting I/O devices.
• We evaluate our approach on five RAT apps and
eight widely-used apps, to show that it is possible
to prevent against attacks from RAT apps without
compromising functionality or introducing signifi-
cant performance overhead.
2 Problem Definition
In this section, we describe Remote Access Trojans
(RATs) to demonstrate attacks that exploit use of I/O de-
vices. We then examine the state-of-the-art in permis-
sion granting for mobile platforms to understand why
such malware apps are capable of exploiting I/O devices
on smartphones. We then outline the challenges for de-
fenses capable of blocking such attacks.
2.1 Remote Access Trojans (RATs)
On smartphones, Remote Access Trojans (RATs) are ma-
licious apps users may be tricked into installing on their
smartphones that aim to violate users’ privacy and data
confidentiality. RATs collect security-sensitive informa-
tion through on-board I/O devices, such as cameras, mi-
crophones, and screen buffers using authorized app per-
missions to perform stealthy, malicious operations in-
cluding taking photos and videos, recording audio, or
capturing screenshots.
Researchers have designed and developed mobile
RATs to demonstrate limitations of current access con-
trol models adopted in mobile OSs. Examples include:
PlaceRaider [22], which uses the camera and other sen-
sors to construct rich, three-dimensional, models of in-
door environments; and Soundcomber [23], which exfil-
trates sensitive data, such as credit card and PIN num-
bers, from both tones and speech-based interaction with
phone menu systems. Real-world RATs are also avail-
able online for purchase. Two popular ones, widely dis-
cussed in security blogs and anti-virus companies, are:
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Dendroid [1], which takes photos using the phone’s cam-
era, records audio and video, downloads existing photos,
records calls, sends texts, etc. and Krysanec [3], which
takes photos, records audio through the microphone, lo-
cates victims via devices’ GPS, views victims’ contact
list, and intercepts and sends text messages.
We reverse engineered and statically analyzed these
RATs. The two real-world RATs were leaked on-
line, whereas the two proof-of-concept RATs have been
shared by researchers. From the analysis, we obtained
details on how RATs work. We found out that: (1) all
analyzed RATs require a specific set of permissions to
access on-board I/O devices, except when accessing the
screen buffers; (2) all of them run a background service
that stealthily performs malicious operations to abuse
permissions granted at install time or first use; (3) none
of their activities is shown on screen; (4) all of them need
access to the Internet to leak security-sensitive data col-
lected; and (5) their stealthy operations are never associ-
ated with any user interaction with the smartphone.
2.2 Limits of Permission Granting
Mobile OSes currently support two default mechanisms
to grant apps permission to access on-board I/O devices.
First, in Android OS, users grant apps permission to
access I/O devices at install time. Apps receiving per-
mission at install time can then access I/O devices at any
time, without further user approval, so users are unable
to track how and when sensitive on-board I/O devices are
accessed by apps at runtime. Table 1 summarizes the
permission sets required by the analyzed RAT apps to
perform stealthy operations. We found out that: (1) all
permissions used by RAT apps to perform stealthy oper-
ations are classified as dangerous by the official Android
OS documentation [4]; (2) users are never notified about
accesses to security-sensitive on-board I/O devices2at
runtime, via on-screen prompts, or notifications; and (3)
the same sets of permissions are used by well-known be-
nign apps downloaded by millions of users worldwide.
We performed an extensive analysis of permission sets
used by apps by randomly selecting 74 apps from third-
party app stores [11, 10] and 329 apps from the official
Google Play [8]. The results cause concern: 83.89% of
apps from the official Google Play store could potentially
take stealthy screenshots, whereas 25.68% of apps from
third-party app stores could potentially take stealthy pho-
tos (complete analysis results are reported in Appendix
A).
Second, starting from Android OS 6.0 (Marshmal-
low) and in other mobile operating systems, such as Ap-
ple iOS and Windows Phone OS, users are prompted
2Users could notice the Wi-Fi or cellular network icon on the phone
screen status bar, but they do not know what app is responsible for the
network traffic, and what data is flowing out through the network.
Table 1: Android Permissions used by RAT apps
Permissions required
to perform Operation
Protection
Levels
User
Notified
Stealthy Photo CAMERA
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
Dangerous No
Stealthy Video RECORD AUDIO, CAMERA
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
Dangerous No
Stealthy Audio RECORD AUDIO
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
Dangerous No
Stealthy Screenshot WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE Dangerous No
Remote Data Transfer INTERNET Dangerous No1
with access requests the first time apps request access to
I/O devices. Researchers have shown that, while these
prompts attempt to verify users’ intent, in practice, they
create an excessive burden on users, which leads to users
ignoring these prompts eventually3. In addition, these
mobile operating systems allow users to manage permis-
sion grants at runtime by accessing a per app or per I/O
device permission control panel. This feature allows for
better flexibility in permission granting, since it is now
possible to revoke, at runtime, permissions granted to
apps at install time or first use.
Unfortunately, neither of these mechanisms ensure
that sensitive operations targeting on-board I/O devices
are performed only in response to users’ interaction with
running apps, which must unmistakeably bind the user’s
consent with specific security-sensitive operations tar-
geting an I/O devices. In the absence of such binding,
malicious apps are free to leverage I/O devices, even
while running as background services, once they can
trick users into granting them permissions as shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Effect of the lack of binding between users’
interaction and operations performed by running apps
2.3 Challenges in Preventing RAT Exploits
Researchers have identified several attacks targeting on-
board I/O devices [22, 23], and proposed various defense
mechanisms [25, 26, 29, 5]. Unfortunately, significant
attacks are still capable of circumventing proposed de-
fenses. Furthermore, most anti-malware tools available
for smartphones are not able to identify apps behaving as
RATs, especially if not advertised and commercialized as
3Prompts are disruptive and cause excessive fatigue, conditioning
user to simply accept any prompt query, resulting in undermining the
usefulness of the prompts [24, 19, 36].
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spying tools on the Web4. Similarly, current static analy-
sis tools [12, 32, 33, 14] designed to analyze apps’ source
code to identify malice are often not able to find stealthy
operations targeting I/O devices5.
On one hand, several attempts have been made, in the
past, to include users or surrounding environments in
the access control decision mechanism. Unfortunately,
User-Driver Access Control (UDAC) [25] is subject to
social-engineering attacks [28], whereas World-Driven
Access Control (WDAC) [26] limits the objects that may
be recorded, but does not enable users to control when
apps use I/O devices for recording. However, solutions
to prevent social-engineering attacks [28] currently re-
quire users to pay attention to the security status of an
operation throughout its execution, rather than just at the
beginning and end. On the other hand, researchers have
also proposed methods to augment contemporary access
control models based on the Android Permission mech-
anism [4, 24] and SE Android [29, 5]. Android Secu-
rity Modules (ASM) [30] enable apps to assist in se-
curity decision-making, but unfortunately the apps per-
forming operations are the adversary we must control;
whereas Android Security Framework (ASF) [31], which
operates at the kernel level, does not have the neces-
sary information about higher level events required to de-
tect security-sensitive operations performed by processes
running apps. Additionally, solutions that leverage hard-
ware support for app isolation, such as Samsung Knox
[18], would prevent apps in one domain from stealing
sensitive data from apps in other domains, but RAT apps
can still perform stealthy operations within their own do-
main.
Despite the various efforts above, several open chal-
lenges remain to be addressed:
• Once apps obtain permission, at install time or at
first use, they may stealthily access sensitive I/O de-
vices at any time.
• Mobile operating systems lack a method to connect
user interactions with security-sensitive operations
targeting on-board I/O devices for controlling ac-
cess to such operations.
• Apps may use social-engineering techniques [16,
27, 28] to hijacking user-intended activities and
trick users in authorizing undesired operations.
In addition, any effectitve solution to these problems
must only require user input and attention consistent with
normal application use.
4We have tested the 15 most popular Android anti-malware tools,
complete results are reported in Appendix B.
5We have tested 2 static and 2 dynamic analysis tools currently
adopted by researchers and the general mobile app community. Com-
plete results are reported in Appendix C.
3 Background
In this paper, we focus our attention on Android OS due
to its open-source nature, availability, and popularity [2].
Similar considerations hold true for other mobile operat-
ing systems, such as Apple iOS and Windows Phone OS.
In the following subsections, we provide background in-
formation useful to understand the mechanisms proposed
in this paper.
3.1 I/O Device Management in Android
We briefly describe how processes obtain access to on-
board I/O devices in Android OS. For performance and
security reasons, only the Linux kernel has direct ac-
cess to on-board I/O device drivers. The Hardware Ab-
straction Layer (HAL) implements an interface that al-
lows system services (privileged Android processes) to
indirectly access on-board I/O devices via well-defined
APIs. SE Linux for Android guarantees that only sys-
tem services can access on-board I/O devices at run-
time. Thus, apps must communicate with system ser-
vices, through the Binder mechanism [4], to request ex-
ecution of specific operations targeting on-board I/O de-
vices. The system services designed to handle requests
from apps would then execute the operations on be-
half of processes running apps, if and only if, the nec-
essary permissions have been granted to the request-
ing apps by the user or operating system. Permis-
sions are validated by the Package Manager, part of
Android OS, each time apps request to perform oper-
ations targeting I/O devices. For instance, for opera-
tions targeting the microphone, the Package Manager
checks the apps AndroidManifest.xml files to verify
if the RECORD AUDIO permission has been granted to
the requesting app. If the required permissions are not
granted to apps, the Package Manager fires up a security
exception to communicate the operation abortion. An-
droid services do not require a permission check for apps
to access the screen buffer.
3.2 Android UI Graphical Elements
The Android User Interface is composed by three main
graphical elements, as depicted in Figure 2 (A). Different
manufacturers may different layouts, but all distributions
of the Android OS have the same three main elements.
The Status Bar shows the device’s state, such as bat-
tery level and network connectivity. The Navigation Bar
includes three navigation buttons to interact with all cur-
rently running apps and the home screen. The Activity
Window is the only portion of the screen that processes
running apps can draw graphical elements on, such as
Activities and Views inside activities. All activities cre-
ated by apps are drawn in the system-managed Activity
Window. Activities are organized in a stack managed by
the ActivityManager system service, the only process al-
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(A) (B)
Figure 2: Android User Interface Graphical Elements
and Gestures to bring back the Navigation and Status
Bars into view when apps are in full screen mode
lowed to manage these three main graphical elements.
The only activity shown to the user is the one on top
of the stack, even though, previously displayed activi-
ties might be visible if the new activity on top is only
partially covering the Activity Window.
The Activity Window becomes the only graphical el-
ement visible on screen when apps go in Full Screen
mode. Starting from version 4.4, the Android OS of-
fers apps two approaches to go full screen: Lean Back6
and Immersive7. In both approaches, all persistent sys-
tem bars are hidden. The difference between them is how
the user brings the bars back into view, as shown in Fig-
ure 2 (B). In Lean Back mode, users can bring back the
bars by simply touching the screen anywhere. Whereas,
in Immersive mode, they can just swipe from any edge
where a system bar is hidden. This gestures are easy and
intuitive, an explanatory message appears on screen the
first time the app goes full screen.
4 Security Model
When designing Aware, we focus on defending against
any process running an app that has permissions to ac-
cess security-sensitive, on-board I/O devices (e.g., cam-
era, microphone, and touch screen) based on the follow-
ing threat model.
We assume that adversaries have no control over the
operating system (e.g., Linux kernel and Android OS)
or Android system apps (e.g., SystemUI) and services
(e.g., Binder, AudioSystem, MediaServer, SensorMan-
ager, InputManager and WindowManager). Next, we as-
sume that SEAndroid enforces mandatory access control
over access to on-board I/O devices, preventing unautho-
rized access from apps containing native code. There-
fore, we assume that only system services can access
on-board I/O devices indirectly through the use of the
Java Native Interface (JNI) [7] to the Linux kernel. Fur-
6Used when users won’t be interacting heavily with the screen while
consuming content, like while watching a video.
7Mainly intended for apps in which the user will be heavily inter-
acting with the full screen as part of the primary experience, like while
playing games, viewing images in a gallery, or reading a book.
ther, we assume apps can access I/O devices only through
APIs provided by the standard Android SDK [4]. Finally,
we assume that Android system services can enforce ac-
cess control policies that are applied at the time that data
would be collected from an I/O device only. We aim to
control whether apps can receive data produced by on-
board I/O devices, but do not provide any guarantee after
the app is granted access to the data itself.
Adversaries in control of apps may cause threats by
executing the following operations. First, adversarial
apps request use of security-sensitive operations on on-
board I/O devices, including accessing devices’ camera
to take picture or video recording, devices’ microphones
to record users’ voices or surrounding environments, and
devices’ screens to steal security sensitive information
displayed to users. Additionally, adversarial apps may
alter the display to launch social-engineering attacks to
trick users into consenting to operations they do not want
by overlaying a frame buffer over another apps’ or sys-
tem component’s display or displaying a request for one
operation then performing a different operation.
5 Aware Design Overview
5.1 Aware Operation
An overview of the Aware design is shown in Figure 3.
In the overview description, we use Android OS as refer-
ence, similar considerations hold for other mobile oper-
ating systems available on the market. Typically, a pro-
cess Prc, running an Android app, sends a request to per-
form an operation Opr using a specific I/O device Dev
(step 1 ). An example could be a request from an app
(Prc) to access the front camera (Dev) and take a photo
(Opr). The request is received by a system service Srv
(e.g., the MediaServer for the camera), one of the privi-
leged processes in charge of authorizing and processing
access requests to system resources. At first, the conven-
tional access control mechanisms are activated (step 2 ).
For instance, in Android OS, the Android permissions
and the SE Android access control policy checks are ac-
tivated. If the result of the conventional access control
enforcement is a denial, then the system service Srv is
notified of the security exception, which in turn notifies
the requesting process Prc of the access denial (step 3 ).
Otherwise, if the result of the conventional access control
enforcement is a grant, Aware is activated in order to im-
plement its additional access control conditional checks.
The Aware Conditional Engine collects information
about the process Prc requesting a certain operation Opr
over a target device Dev (step 4 ) through the system
service Srv. Based on this information, the Aware Con-
ditional Engine then identifies and selects, from the Con-
ditional Rule Store, the set of conditional rules Cnds that
must be satisfied to allow operation Opr to be performed
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Figure 3: Overview of the Aware Design
on behalf of process Prc, over the target device Dev, by
the system service Srv (step 5 ). Subsequently, Aware
collects the measurements necessary to evaluate if the se-
lected conditional rules are satisfied (step 6 ). Measure-
ments can involve readings from on-board I/O devices
and sensors, or system events necessary to verify specific
environmental conditions. If and only if all the selected
conditional rules Cnds are satisfied, then Aware gener-
ates an authorized session during which the system ser-
vice Srv is authorized to perform the security-sensitive
operation Opr, over the target device Dev, on behalf
of process Prc (step 7 ). During authorized sessions,
Aware verifies that all conditional rules remain satisfied
during the entire session and notifies users about ongoing
operations (step 8 ). Whenever any of the selected con-
ditional rules is not satisfied, Aware abort the operation
Opr and notifies the service Srv about the set of unsatis-
fied conditional rules via a denial message (step 9 ).
5.2 Aware Conditional Engine
Aware Conditional Engine uses conditional rules to au-
thorize app requests to I/O devices and maintain security
state during any authorized sessions. To verify the sat-
isfaction of conditional rules, Aware is designed to col-
lect inputs from I/O devices, sensors and system services
at run-time, by using additional hooks placed inside the
Android framework. Aware conditional rules are of three
types: (1) Preconditions that must be satisfied before an
operation targeting I/O devices is authorized; (2) Ongo-
ing Conditions that must be satisfied while the authorized
operations targeting I/O devices are being performed, un-
til their completion; and (3) Exit Conditions that must be
all satisfied once authorized operations terminate due to
users’ actions or runtime exceptions.
Aware Preconditions ensure two security properties.
SP1 All app requests to perform security-sensitive oper-
ations targeting on-board I/O devices must be authorized.
This security property prevents processes from perform-
ing such operations stealthly. SP2 Security-sensitive op-
erations performed using on-board I/O devices match a
users’ consenting action. This property ensures that ev-
ery such operation is initiated by a user action. Aware
Ongoing Conditions ensure two additional security prop-
erties. SP3 Ongoing security-sensitive operations target-
ing I/O devices are always visible to users. This secu-
rity property enables users to check that the authorized
operation is what they expected, reducing the possibil-
ity of undetected social-engineering attacks. SP4 On-
going security-sensitive operations targeting I/O devices
are always logged. Such logging enables users to exam-
ine the progress of ongoing security-sensitive operations,
which may enable termination of an ongoing operation
deemed suspicious or retrospective analysis of past oper-
ations. Aware Exit Conditions ensure one more security
property. SP5 All ongoing security-sensitive operations
targeting I/O devices are visible to the user as long as
they run. This property ensures that apps cannot keep
operations running after user terminates them and the
user interface correctly removes only terminated oper-
ations from the display. The conditional rules and secu-
rity properties above mentioned are summarized, for fu-
ture reference, in Table 2. To express Aware conditional
rules, the Usage Control (UCON) model [20] could be
adopted.
6 Aware Design
We present the Aware design in terms of four mecha-
nisms necessary to fulfill the five security properties.
6.1 Mediation of Access Requests
Complete mediation of all requests to access I/O devices
from processes running apps and matching each request
to a user input corresponding to the app request is neces-
sary to ensure that only authorized app requests are run,
guaranteeing SP1 . Mediation involves several system
services, such as services controlling gestures on screen,
or handling requests from running processes, when tar-
geting on-board I/O devices and sensors. Users’ interac-
tion events have to be aggregated and mapped to requests
instantiated by processes running apps. The SE Android
reference monitor must be extended to ensure complete
mediation of all security-sensitive operations targeting
I/O devices [21]. Identifying the right locations where
to place additional hooks, to mediate every access to I/O
devices, is challenging.
Mainly, complete mediation of accesses to I/O devices
can be achieved in two ways: (1) by placing hooks inside
the Android framework and libraries, or (2) by placing
hooks inside the Linux kernel and I/O device drivers. To
achieve complete mediation of accesses to I/O devices,
which are low-level system resources, the kernel and de-
6
Table 2: Aware Conditional Rules and Security Properties
Preconditions Security Properties
P1 User interacts with process Prc to request operation Opr targeting device Dev
P2 Process Prc requests Service Srv to perform operation Opr over device Dev
P3 User is aware of what operation Opr, targeting device Dev, is going to be
performed by Service Srv on behalf of process Prc
P4 User approves operation Opr on behalf of process Prc targeting device Dev
SP1 All app requests to perform security-sensitive operations targeting
on-board I/O devices must be authorized
SP2 Security-sensitive operations performed using on-board I/O devices
match a users’ consenting action
Ongoing Conditions
O1 User has continuous visibility of operation Opr performed
on behalf of process Prc over device Dev
O2 The authorized session Ses, for process Prc to execute operation Opr
over device Dev, is logged to allow retroactive actions
SP3 Ongoing security-sensitive operations targeting I/O devices are always
visible to users
SP4 Ongoing security-sensitive operations targeting I/O devices are always
logged
Exit Conditions
E1 The authorized session Ses, relative to process Prc, terminates
E2 Termination of session Ses is logged
E3 User has visibility that session Ses has been terminated
SP5 All on-going security-sensitive operations targeting I/O devices
are visible to the user as long as they run
vice drivers seem to be the most appropriate place where
to add mediation hooks. However, two main issues arise
from this approach: (1) low level hooks would not have
the required level of information to map requests to pro-
cesses running apps, due to the fact that requests are
always handled by system services on behalf of the re-
questing processes; (2) mobile platforms are equipped
with different I/O devices, which would require the op-
erating system to be able to support customized hooks
defined for different drivers by driver vendors.
In Aware, hooks are placed at the Android framework
and libraries level, to avoid the above mentioned issues.
Aware Hooks provide complete mediation, because sys-
tem services are the only path through which processes,
running apps, can access I/O devices and sensors, due
to Android framework architecture and MAC rules en-
forced by SE Android [5]. We have dynamically ana-
lyzed the Android framework and libraries code, rela-
tive to SDK APIs handling accesses to I/O devices and
sensors, to validate complete mediation, and check that
every access to the I/O devices and sensors is captured
by one of the 18 hooks introduced. Retaining such log-
ging could be used to detect errors, if any exist. Call-
backs from hooks inform the Aware Conditional Engine
about users interacting with processes running apps, and
requesting operations over I/O devices. These callbacks
are used to validate precondition P1 . Aware Hooks
also capture resources acquisition and release by system
services operating on behalf of processes running apps.
Callbacks from these hooks are used to validate precon-
dition P2 and exit condition E1 . Satisfying these
conditions is sufficient to reliably bind users interaction
with apps requests to operate over I/O devices, therefore
guaranteeing SP1 .
6.2 Visibility over Sensitive Operations
Secure display of operations targeting I/O devices when
they are requested, when they are ongoing, and when
they are terminated is necessary to fulfill multiple guar-
antees. First, by maintaining visibility of operations after
they are authorized, users may identify undesired oper-
ations approved by mistake to guarantee SP3 . Further-
more, ensuring that operations are visible to users as long
as they run guarantees that there are no stealthy operation
on I/O devices ongoing SP5 . Visibility over accesses
to I/O devices from running apps may be provided to
users in four different ways: (1) via notification lights,
similar to those used for cameras on laptops or external
USB cameras; (2) by playing a distinctive sound, simi-
lar to the shutter sound produced when taking a photo;
(3) by displaying notification icons, similar to the loca-
tion icon shown on the status bar; and (4) by visualiz-
ing alert messages on screen. Unfortunately, notification
lights, sounds, or notification icons can only alert users
about accesses to sensitive I/O devices, but cannot con-
vey exact information about operations performed, target
devices, and processes responsible for such operations.
Furthermore, the sounds might not be audible in silent
or vibrate mode. A better way to convey complete infor-
mation about operations performed over I/O devices, by
running processes, is by displaying on screen alert mes-
sages to users.
Solutions that make use of the Activity Window portion
of the screen, to display access notifications or alert mes-
sages, are subject to user deception attacks, were screen
overlays are used by malicious apps to surreptitiously re-
place, or mimic, the GUI of other apps and mount social-
engineering attacks, or else mislead the user perception
of ongoing operations.
Aware avoids this problem by displays Security Mes-
sages to users on the Status Bar, a reserved portion of
the screen drawable only by the WindowManager sys-
tem service, a privileged process part of the Android OS.
A similar approach has been adopted by Bianchi et al.
[28], where the Navigation Bar has been used to host a
security indicator as solution against User Interface (UI)
deception. However, Bianchi’s solution, as it is, can-
not be adopted to provide visibility to users about op-
erations targeting I/O devices or to automatically prevent
operation programmatically initiated by processes run-
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Figure 4: Security Messages displayed on the Status Bar
ning apps, without users interaction. In fact, Bianchi’s
solution does not provide the necessary mechanisms to
bind users interaction to access requests for I/O devices
from processes running apps.
Aware uses Security Messages displayed on the Status
Bar to convey, to users, two types of events: (1) pend-
ing operations initiated by users; and (2) status feedback
about ongoing operations authorized by users. A Secu-
rity Message includes the app identifier (e.g., app icon or
name) and a text message specifying the target operation.
The first type of message makes users aware of the opera-
tion resulting from the interaction with a soft-button dis-
played by an app on screen. For example, in Figure 4 (A),
if the user presses the button depicting a camera, the Se-
curity Message specifies that the Instagram app will take
a photo using the smartphone front camera8. The second
type of message informs users about ongoing authorized
sessions targeting on-board I/O devices. As example, in
Figure 4 (B), a Security Message is used to inform the
user that the Google Voice Search app is using the mi-
crophone to listen to the user voice for commands. If
multiple operations are simultaneously targeting differ-
ent I/O devices, the Security Message alternate messages
to make users aware of all the ongoing operations.
Security Messages are used to validate precondition
P3 , ongoing condition O1 and exit condition E3 . Sat-
isfying these conditions is sufficient to reliably provide
visibility to users over sensitive operations targeting I/O
devices, therefore guaranteeing SP3 and SP5 .
Aware Security Messages are always visible to users
even if apps are in full screen mode. Upon use-initiated
operations targeting I/O devices (i.e., press soft-button to
take a photo), Aware systematically reactivates the Status
Bar to display a Security Message specifying the pending
operation. Thus, any attempt by malicious apps to draw a
fake Status Bar with a fake Security Message would fail,
since the original Status Bar is always drawn on screen.
8(F) used to indicate front camera and (B) indicate back camera.
Figure 5: State Transition Diagram for Security Mes-
sages based on User-Initiated Interactions
6.3 Eliciting User Input for Approval
The requirement for users to approve or abort pending
app requests for operations on I/O devices by providing
user input through GUI elements, guarantees SP2 . On-
screen prompts could be used to request approval, ev-
ery time I/O devices are accessed by a process running
an app, in response to user-initiated interactions. How-
ever, while prompts attempt to verify users’ intention,
in practice, they create an excessive burden on users,
which leads to users ignoring these prompts eventually9.
Therefore, prompting users every time I/O devices are
accessed seems unreasonable.
To avoid excessive burden on users and, at the same
time, enforce a per-access approval, Aware uses a Ges-
ture Identification mechanism to identifying specific se-
quence of gestures, by users, on smartphones’ screen.
Gestures are intercepted and analyzed, in real-time, to in-
fer users’ intention when interacting with apps. Captured
gestures on screen are mapped with undergoing opera-
tions performed by apps running in foreground. User-
initiated interactions are combined with Security Mes-
sage on screen, as depicted in the state machine diagram
in Figure 5. With Aware, operations targeting I/O devices
can only be initiated by user, pressing and holding down
a soft-button on screen. Upon user-initiated operations,
Aware displays the pending operation on a Security Mes-
sage, for a preset time period, after which the operation
is abort in absence of user interaction10. After looking at
the Security Message users can confirm the operation by
simply releasing the soft-button, or aborting the pending
operation by sliding their finger out from the soft-button
area, as shown in Figure 6 (A).
We could have designed Aware in order to have two
different areas of the screen where users could place their
finger to either deny or allow operations, as shown in
figure 6 (B). This solution would have been subject to
social-engineering attacks because the two areas would
appear in the Activity Window, allowing malicious apps
to overlay fake messages, and swap the deny area with
the allow area to trick the user into allowing an operation.
The Aware Gesture Identification mechanism also
support an alternative method that makes use of the fin-
gerprint scanner to authenticate users interacting with
9On average, there are 8 requests per minute by processes running
apps to request permission to access sensitive resources [36].
10The timer is used to support apps that require users to keep press-
ing down a button to perform the operation (i.e., record a video).
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Figure 6: Alternative Approaches to retrieve Users Input
smartphonesUsers scan their finger to confirm pending
operations displayed on Security Messages, as illustrated
on the right side of Figure 6 (C). Aware interprets the
absence of specific sequences of gestures, from users,
how operations not matching users’ intention and vo-
lition, therefore, blocks and logs attempts from mali-
cious apps trying to programmatically activate security-
sensitive operations targeting on-board I/O device. The
Gesture Identification mechanism is used to validate pre-
condition P4 , which in conjunction with P1 , P2 and
P3 are sufficient to guarantee that operations performed
over on-board I/O devices match users’ intention and vo-
lition, therefore guaranteeing SP2 .
For users willing to lower the security of their mobile
platforms, Aware allows to disable the Gesture Identifi-
cation mechanism per-app or when a remote controller
(i.e., Bluetooth selfie stick) is used. However, we dis-
courage white listing apps, even after a certain period of
usage, because apps can dynamically change their behav-
ior during time, due to automatic, periodic, software up-
dates. Furthermore, apps could ask another apps to per-
form specific operations targeting I/O devices, through
the intent mechanism. Thus, a white listed app could be
tricked in serving a request coming from a malicious app.
6.4 Supporting Retrospective Actions
The requirement to log actions occurring during the ex-
ecution of operations targeting I/O devices, guarantees
SP4 . To support retroactive actions by users, Aware
generates three type of access logs for security-sensitive
operation targeting on-board I/O devices. First, Aware
logs any failed attempt by running processes in access-
ing I/O devices, due to lack of necessary conditions re-
quired to allow requested operations. These logs are ac-
cessible in the Blocked Accesses section, shown in Fig-
ure 7, and allow users to identify apps that attempts
to perform stealthy operations while running as back-
ground services. Second, Aware logs any operation de-
nied by users though the Gesture Identification mecha-
nism. These logs are accessible in the Denied Accesses
section, shown in Figure 7, and allow users to identify
apps using social-engineering techniques to trick them
in authorizing undesired operations. Third, Aware log
any operation performed over I/O devices, authorized by
users though the Gesture Identification mechanism, al-
lowing users to track authorized operations.
To better catch users’ attention, attempted access vi-
olations are signaled by Aware by producing a sound
and showing a Security Message communicating unde-
sired behaviors from running apps. The Aware Logs can
be accessed by users anytime, from the app menu or by
tapping on the Security Message displayed on the Status
Bar. Each access log entry reports information regarding
apps ID, date, time and operations performed by apps, as
shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: On-Board I/O Devices Access Logs
Aware Logs allow users to perform two retrospective
actions: (1) uninstall apps identified as malicious, and
(2) revoke granted permissions to prevent future unde-
sired accesses11. Retrospective actions can be taken by
users either immediately, when the I/O devices is still be-
ing used by apps to block undesired operations, or after
reviewing what apps are doing over time.
The Aware Log mechanism is used to validate Ongo-
ing Condition O2 and Exit Condition E2 . Satisfying
these conditions is sufficient to allow users to perform
retrospective actions over sensitive operations targeting
I/O devices, therefore guaranteeing SP4 .
7 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Aware by modify-
ing a recent release12 of standard Android OS (version
android-6.0.1 r5) available through the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) [6]. The Aware prototype in-
cludes new components and modifies some pre-existing
system services, libraries and the SystemUI app. Their
footprint is about 325 LOC in C, 680 LOC in C++ and
11This mechanism supports the Android AppOps mechanism rein-
troduced starting from Android OS 6.0 Marshmallow [4], which allows
to revoke permissions granted at install time, to running apps.
12A script to automatically integrate Aware on top of previous ver-
sions of Android framework components and libraries is also available.
Aware source code will be made available on github.com.
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882 LOC in Java. We tested the Aware prototype on a
Nexus 5 and Nexus 5X13 smartphones. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we briefly describe the new and modified
Aware components.
Aware Hooks are placed inside the original AudioSys-
tem, MediaServer and SensorManager system services
to capture the acquisition and release of I/O devices and
the reading of sensor data. Other hooks are placed in-
side the original InputManager and GestureDetector to
capture users’ input events. Hooks retrieve the PID of
the calling processes, operations requested Opr and tar-
get devices Dev, which are then passed as a parameters
in a call back to the Aware Conditional Engine.
Aware Security Messages are implemented by modi-
fying the SurfaceManager, SurfaceFlinger, WindowMan-
ager and the SystemUI. In particular, an ImageView has
been added to the Status Bar to display app IDs. Fur-
thermore, a TextView has been added to display ongoing
operations, and the service handling the status bar has
been modified to receive and handle intent actions sent
by the Aware Conditional Engine.
The Aware Conditional Engine is a new component
added to the original Android framework. It includes:
(1) the Callback Handler in charge of processing call-
backs from Aware hooks, (2) the Verification Service, in
charge of validating preconditions, ongoing conditions,
and exit conditions based on the information retrieved
from callbacks by Aware Hook; and (3) the Conditional
Rule Store, designed to store and retrieve conditional
rules used to enforce control over I/O devices.
The Aware Gesture Identification module is imple-
mented by modifying the InputManager, NativeInput-
Manager, FingerprintManager, InputFlinger and Ges-
tureDetector, to translate raw input data into higher-level
events (key press, gesture, and such), and then propa-
gates them to the Conditional Engine through callbacks.
8 User Study and Aware Evaluation
8.1 Study Objectives
We performed a comprehensive laboratory-based survey,
user study, and system experiments with the following
five objectives. First, we survey users’ privacy and se-
curity attitudes as they pertain to the malicious use of
I/O devices, and investigate users’ awareness about RAT
attacks. Second, we observe users’ vigilance during a
series of interactive tasks, while RAT attacks targeting
on-board I/O devices are deployed and the Aware de-
fense mechanisms are not active. Third, we investigate
the effectiveness of Aware from two perspectives. Ini-
tially, during another series of interactive tasks, we ob-
serve whether users notice and can adequately respond
to customized social-engineering attacks, when those can
13Equipped with a fingerprint scanner.
be thwarted with the user interface components ofAware.
We then debrief users about their experience with Aware.
Fourth, we measure whether Aware effectively and sys-
tematically shields users from practically deployed RAT
attacks, while they perform the second series of interac-
tion tasks. Fifth, we measure the performance overhead
Aware incurs on the critical paths of processing app re-
quests.
8.2 Study Components
The study has three survey components, two interactive
user task sequences, and one group of measured tasks.
We obtained IRB approval at our institution.
Surveys: Individuals completed an initial question-
naire with demographic questions and questions about
their usage of mobile platforms. A second survey de-
briefed participants about the first series of interactive
tasks, performed using an of-the-shelf Android smart-
phone and investigated their privacy and security atti-
tudes. A third survey debriefed participants about the
second series of interaction tasks, performed using a
smartphone running Aware, and their perceptions about
Aware. The surveys included standard Likert-type psy-
chometric scale questions (e.g., to measure attitudes) as
well as open-ended question formats (e.g., to solicit par-
ticipants’ experiences during the interactive tasks). Sur-
veys were implemented on Qualtrics and executed on a
lab computer.
Interactive Tasks: In the first series of interactive
tasks, we studied participants’ potential reactions to
practically deployed RAT attacks. Participants were
asked to interact with a Nexus 5 smartphone, running
a vanilla version of the Android OS (6.0.1 r25), and to
perform 9 tasks ranging from taking a picture with the
smartphone’s camera to sending an email. The first 5
tasks (T1-T5), summarized in Table 3, were not associ-
ated with any RAT attacks. Tasks T6-T10 were associ-
ated with 4 different, visibly noticeable attacks (A1-A4),
also summarized in Table 3. These attacks were care-
fully triggered by the experimenter, while participants
engaged in the interactive tasks. The attacks varied in
the degree to which they are perceivable, as highlighted
in Table 3. Please note that individuals were not explic-
itly instructed about the presence of RAT attacks before
the tasks, however we asked them to report unusual be-
haviors verbally and in the survey.
Before the second series of interactive tasks, subjects
were debriefed about the previously experienced attacks.
We further familiarized them with the Aware system
through instructional materials and by allowing them to
inspect the Aware user interface on a Nexus 5X smart-
phone. As before, the participants were engaged in sev-
eral interactive tasks. First, participants engaged in tasks
T1-T5 and T10, which did not present any noticeable
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Table 3: List of Experimental Tasks and Attacks Description
Task ID Task Description App Used Attack Source Attack Description Perceivable Detection Rate
T1 Take a picture Instagram (B) None N/A N/A N/A
T2 Take a video Fideo (B) None N/A N/A N/A
T3 Record a voice message Messenger (B) None N/A N/A N/A
T4 Record a video message Skype (B) None N/A N/A N/A
T5 Record the device screen Rec. (B) None N/A N/A N/A
T6-A1 Navigate Internet Chrome (B) Krysanec (M) Stealthy Photo Camera Shutter Sound 18%
T7-A2 Watch a Video YouTube (B) Soundcomber (M) Stealthy Voice Recording None 0%
T8-A3 Add a new contact Contacts (B) Dendroid (M) Stealthy Video Recording UI Slow Down 1%
T9-A4 Send email Gmail (B) PlaceRaider (M) Stealthy Photos UI Slow Down 0%
T10 Take a screenshot None* None N/A N/A N/A
T11-A5 Record a video SimpleFilters † SimpleFilters † Stealthy Screenshot Security Message Mismatch 82%
T12-A6 Take a photo SimpleFilters † SimpleFilters † Stealthy Voice Record Security Message Mismatch 76%
T13 Analyze Aware Logs Aware Logs (B) None N/A N/A N/A
(B) Benign App (M) Malicious App * Performed by pressing the power and volume-down physical buttons at the same time
† SimpleFilters appears as a benign app, but includes functionality to run additional I/O operations beyond those consented by users
RAT behaviors. Then, in tasks T11 and T12, we used
a test RAT app to investigate users’ responses to attacks
where the user consented to one action, but the app per-
formed additional, unapproved actions. These social-
engineering attacks (A5 and A6) aimed to trick users
into executing unwanted I/O operations, such as record-
ing voice when they consented to the app taking a photo.
Using the Aware security message and gesture mecha-
nism, we investigated whether participants could notice
and thwart the attacks. The series of tasks concluded
with T13, which did not include any attacks. We did
not brief individuals about which tasks were associated
with attacks or which I/O devices would be targeted. We
summarize the 9 tasks and associated attacks in Table 3.
We recorded participants’ interactive behaviors, and
their survey responses. In addition, we applied a think-
aloud protocol by encouraging participants to speak out
about their experiences while being engaged in the tasks.
Measured Evaluation: During the second series of
tasks, participants were still exposed to attacks program-
matically and persistently triggered from the four RAT
apps used in our study (i.e., Krysanec, Soundcomber,
Dendroid, and PlaceRaider). The Aware system was ex-
pected to shield the user from these attacks, and therefore
no noticeable effects should have been observable by the
participants. As such, the purpose of the measurement
task is to evaluate whether Aware effectively and auto-
matically shields the participants while they engage in
realistic user interaction behaviors.
All participants completed the entire set of study com-
ponents in about 25-35 minutes and were compensated
with a $10 gift card.
8.3 Results
Demographics and Mobile Platforms Usage: In total,
74 participants completed the whole set of surveys and
tasks. The majority of the sample were between 20-29
years old (76%). We recruited predominantly undergrad-
uate and graduate students; the majority having an inter-
national background (70%), and fields of study different
from computer science (75%). Most participants actively
used smartphones (99%) and additional devices associ-
ated with third-party apps such as tablets (54%), and to a
lesser extent smart watches and fitness bands (10%).
Privacy Attitudes: We asked participants how con-
cerned they are about threats to their personal privacy
when using smartphones, and found that 43% were mod-
erately or extremely concerned. Participants were even
more concerned about privacy and security aspects as
they related to third-party apps (57%). Most important
to our study, concern levels were high for the misuse of
smartphones’ camera (62%) and microphone (55%).
RAT Awareness and Security Behaviors: The major-
ity of the participants stated that they were aware that
apps could access the camera (56%) and the microphone
(56%) of their smartphones at any time without repeat-
edly asking for consent. However, participants had little
knowledge of specific RATs that exploit smartphones’
I/O devices, such as Dendroid and SoundComber (4%
each), and Krysanec and PlaceRaider (3% each). A small
number of participants (8%) were able to articulate how
malicious apps apply social-engineering techniques to
misled users into taking an action. Only 24% of the
participants use a mobile anti-malware product, whereas
78% of subjects stated that they avoid downloading apps
from unofficial app stores.
Identification of Threats without Aware: The attacks
in the first series of interaction tasks varied in the de-
gree to which risk signals in the vanilla Android system
are perceivable by a user. A1 was associated with the
camera shutter sound when the Krysanec malware took a
stealthy photo, while participants were browsing the In-
ternet. Only 18% correctly noticed that a camera shutter
sound was audible. 8% incorrectly thought that a screen-
shot was taken. 4% merely noticed a sound. Not a sin-
gle participant stated any suspicion in the survey or the
think-aloud comments that malware or a security prob-
lem could be responsible for the sound. Two participants
questioned whether “something” or “someone was tak-
ing a screenshot”. Only one participant noticed the UI
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slow-down (i.e., a perceived glitch in the UI) in task T8-
A3 when a stealthy voice recording was initiated by the
SoundComber app. None of the participants identified
any suspicious activity when being involved in attack
tasks T7-A2 and T9-A4. An overview of the detection
rates for the RAT attacks is available in Table 3.
In summary, audible risk signals (associated with the
built-in camera in A1) are noticed by at least some partic-
ipants, but their interpretation of the risk, ability to iden-
tify the cause or at least to question the cause of the un-
expected behavior is highly limited. State-of-the-art mal-
ware apps engaging in stealthy voice and video record-
ings remained almost entirely unnoticed. PlaceRaider
(A4) which also takes stealthy pictures and sidesteps au-
dible risk signals was not noticed by any participant.
Interaction of Users with Aware: Using Aware sub-
stantially simplifies the problem space of unwanted I/O
access in two ways. First, any access to an I/O device
which is not associated with a user interaction will be
automatically blocked. Thereby, attacks that participants
were encountering in the first series of interactive tasks
would be automatically thwarted. We will verify this as-
pect of Aware’s effectiveness in the subsequent measure-
ment results subsection. Second, only user-intended in-
teractions which explicitly trigger an I/O device will be
allowed to proceed. Note, however, that malicious apps
could nevertheless try to hijack these user-intended ac-
tivities. Aware also aims to thwart attacks that coincide
with such user-intended I/O interactions. For this pur-
pose, Aware provides user interface features (i.e., Aware
security messages and gesture identification) that help
to notice and to block such attacks. In addition, users
can inspect the Aware log to verify which wanted or un-
wanted I/O operations have taken place.
To investigate the effectiveness of Aware when users
encounter such sophisticated attacks (which exploit the
context of users’ interactions), we have customized a
simple photographic filter app called SimpleFilters. The
app is modified to attempt to take a screenshot (A5) and
a voice recording (A6) stealthily when users intention-
ally engage in a different type of I/O interaction. Using
Aware, 82% of the participants noticed the attack while
performing task T11-A5, and 76% noticed the attack
while performing task T12-A6. In contrast to the first
series of user interactions, these participants were also
able to clearly articulate what attacks took place. A typi-
cal debriefing message for attack A5 was: “It was taking
a screenshot, while I asked it to take a video”, whereas
for attack A6, messages were a variations of: “Aware
message said the microphone was being accessed”.
Inspecting the system logs, we were also able to deter-
mine how often participants used the Aware gestures to
block the attacks that they noticed. For A5, all of the 82%
of the participants who noticed the attack successfully
used the gestures to abort the task. Similarly, all partic-
ipants who noticed attack A6 succeeded in blocking the
attempt to record audio instead of taking a picture. In the
final task (T13), we asked individuals to inspect Aware
Logs to evaluate which I/O access operations had taken
place during the second series of interactions. 88% of
all participants found Aware Logs helpful in identifying
suspicious activities from running apps, and they were
clearly able to articulate what attacks had taken place.
After the interaction tasks, we solicited further feed-
back from the participants. 90% of the participants found
Aware more secure than the vanilla Android OS, and
80% found it as (or more) usable compared to the vanilla
Android OS. These are encouraging results since ad-
ditional security mechanisms often meet with user re-
sistance, for example, because they may distract from
the user’s primary task. Further, 57% of the partici-
pants said they would prefer the Aware notice and ges-
ture mechanism compared to other notification options.
For example, only 21% of the participants preferred to be
prompted with a permission dialog at every access. Fur-
ther, only 10% of them stated that they would prefer to
be asked for permission at install time, and 8% of them
at first use. Most importantly, 99% of the participants
would like Aware integrated in their current mobile OS.
Measurements to Evaluate Aware: To evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of Aware in the presence of realistic user in-
teractions, we allowed the 4 RAT apps used in the first
series of user interaction tasks to also be active during the
second series of interaction tasks. We also tested whether
activities from the customized SimpleFilters app would
be blocked if they did not coincide with the users’ inter-
actions with the I/O devices (i.e., in T11 and T12). In or-
der to monitor whether any of the malicious activities of
these RAT apps were successful, we used logcat [4], the
Android logging system, which provides a mechanism
for collecting system debug output about activities from
various apps and system services. For the 74 sessions in-
volving participants, we found that RAT apps attempted
1080 times to perform stealthy operations targeting I/O
devices, but they never succeeded in accessing the on-
board camera, microphone or screen content, as result of
systematically validating preconditions P1 and P4 . In
other words, the absence of users’ interaction and con-
sent prevented RAT apps from succeeding in performing
stealthy operations while running services in the back-
ground. Furthermore, based on the logs, there were no
run-time exceptions, triggered by the Aware components,
which could have caused any of the 9 well-known legiti-
mate apps to crash or unexpectedly terminate.
Summary14: Aware prevented all attempts from RAT
apps to perform stealthy operations that did not coin-
14See Appendix D for a summary of selected results.
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Table 4: Aware Performance Overhead in µs. Numbers
give the mean value and corresponding standard devia-
tion after 10,000 runs.
Vanilla Android OS Aware
Nexus 5 Nexus 5X Nexus 5 Nexus 5X Max (Min)Overhead
Front Camera 15.90±1.54 14.39±1.12 16.11±1.77 15.01±1.38 4.04% (2.21%)
Back Camera 16.08±1.32 15.68±1.87 16.44±1.06 16.37±1.91 4.31% (2.57%)
Microphone 12.36±2.01 11.86±1.99 12.65±2.15 12.32±1.85 4.03% (2.19%)
Screen 17.76±0.99 16.23±0.69 18.61±0.90 17.02±1.01 4.79% (2.94%)
cide with users’ intended I/O access operations and con-
siderably reduced the success rate of social-engineering
attacks, without breaking any apps’ logic. Therefore,
Aware significantly raises the bar compared to the detec-
tion rate of state-of-the-art static/dynamic analysis tools,
and anti-malware tools, available to users to identify ma-
licious apps running on smartphones15. We anticipate
that with additional experience users will become even
more proficient with the Aware security messages and
the gesture mechanism, which would further reduce the
effectiveness of social-engineering techniques. However,
the achieved results are very impressive given the sophis-
ticated nature of the attacks tested with the SimpleFilters
app16. Aware automatically blocks all attacks which
are not carefully socially-engineered and significantly re-
duces the attention burden placed on users, thereby, re-
duces habituation and notice fatigue [38].
8.4 Performance Evaluation
We have measured the overhead introduced by Aware
while handling each access request for operating on-
board I/O devices, such as the camera to take photos
and video, the microphone to record audio, and the
screen to capture screenshots. Due to lack of publicly
available benchmarks for Android OS, we only pro-
vide microbenchmark analysis of such operations for two
phones, a Nexus 5 and a Nexus 5X running Android OS
(version android-6.0.1 r5). The overhead is calculated
by measuring the time interval from the time the request
is made by the process running the app to the time the
operation is granted/denied by Aware. Table 4 reports
the average time over 10,000 requests, the standard devi-
ation and the maximum recorded overhead introduced by
Aware. Overall, Aware introduces a negligible overhead
of the order of 1 µs per access. The maximum recorded
overhead is 4.79% while accessing the screen buffers.
9 Related Work
User-Driven Access Control (UDAC) [25] attempts to in-
clude users in the access control decision loop. Applica-
tion level access control gadgets (ACGs) are used to ver-
15Detailed analysis results reported in Appendices B and C.
16Research on carefully crafted Phishing attacks shows that, even
with repeated security training, a significant share of users will fall for
such attacks [37].
ify that actions requested by apps genuinely comes from
users. However, UDAC is subject to social-engineering
attacks [28, 27, 16], such as draw on top17 and app
switch18, because ACGs are displayed in a portion of the
screen accessible to apps.
SemaDroid [34] is a privacy-aware sensor manage-
ment framework for smartphones that allows users to
monitor sensors usage by installed apps, and control the
disclosure of sensed data. However, users are supported
in identifying undesired accesses only after apps have al-
ready performed operations targeting I/O device.
Petracca et al. [35] propose AuDroid, an extension to
the SELinux reference monitor integrated into the An-
droid OS, to enforce lattice policies over the dynami-
cally changing use of system audio resources (e.g. mi-
crophone and speaker). However, AuDroid only deals
with accesses to microphone and speaker from third-
party apps and does not provide a solid and general solu-
tion for other on-board I/O devices and sensors.
Bianchi et al. [28] address the problem of malicious
apps surreptitiously replacing or mimicking the GUI of
other apps to mount phishing and click-jacking attacks.
However, Bianchi’s solution cannot systematically pre-
vent operations programmatically initiated by processes
running apps, without users’ interaction, because it does
not provide the necessary mechanisms to bind users’ in-
teraction to access requests for I/O devices from pro-
cesses running apps. Moreover, Bianchi’s use visibility
to transfer more responsibility to users when attack sce-
narios have to be identified, whereas visibility should be
used to support users in making decision only when it is
not possible to prevent attacks systematically.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented Aware, a security frame-
work for authorizing app requests to perform sensitive
operations using I/O devices, which binds app requests
with user intentions to make all uses of certain I/O de-
vices explicit. We evaluated the proposed defense mech-
anisms through laboratory-based experimentation and a
user study, involving 74 human subjects, whose abil-
ity to identify undesired operations targeting I/O devices
increased significantly. Without Aware, only 18% of
the participants were able to identify attacks from tested
RAT apps. Aware systematically blocked all the attacks,
in absence of user-initiated interaction, and supported
users in identifying 82% of more sophisticated attacks,
which used social-engineering techniques to hijack user-
initiated operations. Aware introduced only 4.79% max-
imum performance overhead over operations targeting
I/O devices.
17Drawing of graphical elements over other apps.
18Malicious app replaces the legitimate top Activity with one of its
own.
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Appendices
A Android Permission Set Analysis
The analysis of 74 apps from third-party app stores
[11, 10] and 329 apps from the official Google Play [8],
shows concerning results, summarized in Table 5. In par-
ticular, many of the analyzed apps could potentially be-
have as RAT, since they have the necessary permissions
to perform stealthy operations targeting on-board I/O de-
vices. For example, from the Google Play, 83.89% of
apps could potentially take stealthy screenshots. Further-
more, 25.68% of apps from third-party app stores could
potentially take stealthy photos. In each cell of Table 5,
the first value represents the number, the second value
the percentage of apps, among all the app analyzed in
the same category, that have the permissions required to
perform the stealthy operation specified in the first col-
umn. We are not aware if these apps are actually mis-
using their permission, but we want to point out that it is
possible for these apps to misuse their permissions to per-
form stealthy operations, and by statically analyzing the
set of Android permissions used by apps, it is by no mean
sufficient to distinguish between purely benign apps and
malicious apps.
B Anti-Malware Tools Detection Analysis
The analysis results relative to RAT detection by the 15
most popular anti-malware apps, available on Google
Play [8] and used on smartphones by millions of user
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Table 5: Market Apps that potentially could behave as RATs and perform stealthy operations
Potential Feature\Category Game Business Book Comics Commu-
nication
Edu-
cation
Enterta-
inement Total
Third-Party App Stores
Stealthy Screenshots 18 (90.00%) 11 (68.75%) 1 (100.00%) 2 (100.00%) 20 (95.24%) 0 (0.00%) 9 (69.23%) 61 (82.43%)
Stealthy Photos 0 (0.00%) 4 (25.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (50.00%) 13 (61.90%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (7.69%) 19 (25.68%)
Stealthy Videos 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (57.14%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (16.22%)
Stealthy Audio 2 (10.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (57.14%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (30.77%) 18 (24.32%)
Number of Apps 20 16 1 2 21 1 13 74
Google Play Store
Stealthy Screenshots 38 (95.00%) 33 (91.67%) 25 (83.33%) 30 (90.91%) 61 (87.14%) 52 (67.53%) 37 (86.05%) 276 (83.89%)
Stealthy Photos 3 (7.50%) 9 (25.00%) 2 (6.67%) 4 (12.12%) 32 (45.71%) 4 (5.12%) 7 (16.28%) 61 (18.54%)
Stealthy Videos 0 (0.00%) 2 (5.56%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.03%) 27 (38.57%) 1 (1.30%) 3 (6.98%) 35 (10.64%)
Stealthy Audio 0 (0.00%) 3 (8.33%) 2 (6.67%) 3 (9.09%) 30 (42.96%) 6 (7.79%) 4 (9.30%) 48 (14.59%)
Number of Apps 40 36 30 33 70 77 43 329
around the world, are summarized in Table 6. The In-
stalls column indicates the number of installs performed
by users on their smartphones. The Reviews column
specifies how many people gave a personal review and a
score for the anti-malware app on Google Play. Finally,
the Score column reports the average score received by
the app over a scale of 5 by user reviewing the app itself.
All the anti-malware apps have been updated with the
most recent malware database before starting the scan,
indeed 3 anti-malware apps (marked with ⋆ in Table 5)
have detected the Stagefright vulnerability [9] that would
allow malicious code to send fraudulent MMS, only re-
cently discovered. The analysis results are based on
a first scan before malware installation, and a second
scan during the execution of the malware, when the anti-
malware has been kept actively scanning for 10 minutes.
Subsequently, three consecutive scans have been per-
formed, after malware installation. After the first scan,
the anti-malware has been configured to actively keep
scanning. We made sure to select full/deep scan from
the scanning options. The three successive scans have
been manually activated to force the anti-malware to res-
can the entire system. At each new malware installation
the smartphone has been flashed again with a clean copy
of the OS and anti-malware software installation.
The analysis revealed that most anti-malware tools
are able to detect well-known RATs (e.g., Dendroid
and Krysanec). We believe that this is due to the
fact that well-known RATs have been classified and
a signature has been generated and distributed on the
Web. On the other hand, proof-of-concept RATs (e.g.,
PlaceRaider, SoundComber and StealthyStalker) are un-
known and gone undetected by anti-malware tools even
though they use similar techniques used by well-known
RATs. Exceptionally, the AVAST Mobile Security Anti-
Malware identifies some malice in both PlaceRaider and
StealthyStalker.
On the Android OS side, an interesting finding was
that, at install time, an alert was triggered to block the
installation of Krysanec. At the second attempt, the An-
droid OS asked the user if to proceed with the installa-
tion anyhow. Additionally, while uninstalling the app,
Krysanec attacked the operating system by exploiting
privilege escalation.
C Static and Dynamic Analysis Tools
The analysis results relative to RAT detection by four
state-of-the-art static and dynamic analysis tools are re-
ported in Table 6.
VirusTotal [12], originally developed by Hispasec and
now own by Google, is a free service that analyzes sus-
picious files and URLs and facilitates the quick detec-
tion of viruses, worms, trojans, and all kinds of malware.
It uses 56 different anti-malware products and 61 online
scan engines to check for viruses. VirusTotal was se-
lected by PC World as one of the best 100 products of
2007. As shown in Table 6, VirusTotal detects well-know
RATs (e.g., Dendroid and Krysanec). The two RATs are
identified as malicious with a score of respectively 22/56
and 20/56. The nominator in the score fractions refers to
the number of tools that identify the app as potentially
malicious, the denominator indicates the total number of
tools that have analyzed the app.
MassVet [32] compares a submitted app with apps al-
ready on a market, focusing on the difference between
those sharing a similar UI structure (indicating a possi-
ble repackaging relation), and the commonality among
those seemingly unrelated. MassVet uses a “DiffCom”
analysis on top of an efficient similarity comparison al-
gorithm, which maps features of an app’s UI structure or
a method’s control-flow graph to a value for a fast com-
parison. As shown in Table 6, MassVet detects malicious
code in 3 of the 5 RATs analyzed.
Google Bouncer [14] is a codename used by Google,
for a security service introduced early in 2012, to keep
malicious apps off the official Google Play19. Bouncer
19According to Google, Bouncer was responsible for a 40% drop in
the number of malicious apps in its app store.
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Table 6: RAT Detection by the 15 Most Popular Android Anti-Malware Tools
Legend:
✓ Malware Detected
✗ Malware Undetected
◦ Malware Detected as Privacy Violation
⊗ Anti-malware crashed during Scan P
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360 Security Antivirus Boost ⋆ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ 100M-500M 8,092,733 4.6
AndroHelm AntiVirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 100K-500K 5,383 4.1
TrustGo Antivirus & Mobile Security ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 10M-50M 283,332 4.5
AVAST Mobile Security & Antivirus ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 100M-500M 3,481,194 4.5
AVG AntiVirus Security Scan ⋆ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 100M-500M 4,079,893 4.4
Bitdefender Mobile Security & Antivirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 1M-5M 33,909 4.3
Cheetah Mobile Security Antivirus & AppLock ⋆ ✗ ✗ ✗ ◦ ✓ 100M-500M 13,258,188 4.7
Dr Web Anti-virus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 50M-100M 863,913 4.5
ESET Mobile Security & Antivirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 5M-10M 300,470 4.6
Kaspersky Internet Security ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 10M-50M 1,019,526 4.6
Lookout Security & Antivirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 100M-500M 830,941 4.4
Malwarebytes Anti-Malware ✗ ✗ ✗ ⊗ ✓ 1M-5M 53,990 4.3
McAfee Security & Antivirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ 10M-50M 334,162 4.3
Symantec Norton Security & Antivirus ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 10M-50M 509,521 4.4
NQ Security Lab Antivirus Free-Mobile Security ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 10M-50M 497,640 4.3
Table 7: RAT Detection via Static and Dynamic Analysis
Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis
VirusTotal MassVet GoogleBouncer CopperDroid
PlaceRaider ✗ ✗ N/A N/A
SoundComber ✗ ✓ N/A N/A
StealthyStalker ✗ ✓ ✗ N/A
Dendroid ✓ ✗ N/A N/A
Krysanec ✓ ✓ N/A N/A
Legend: ✓ Malware Detected ✗ Malware Undetected
N/A Data Not Available
quietly and automatically scans apps (both new and
previously uploaded ones) and developer accounts in
Google Play with its reputation engine and cloud in-
frastructure. To test the effectiveness of Bouncer, in
detecting RAT apps, we have implemented a proof-of-
concept testing app, called StealthyStalker20, able to take
stealthy photos, videos, screenshots, record audio and hi-
jack user-initiated operations. To release an app through
Google Play, a third-party developer has to participate in
Android developer program and submit to Google for re-
view. The app is signed and published by Google only
after it passes the review process. As shown in Table
6 and Figure 8, the StealthyStalker app (submitted for
publication with the fake name of SimpleFilter) success-
fully passed the Google Play (Bouncer) review and pub-
lished, after a couple of hours, despite the hidden ma-
licious code. This means that Google Bouncer did not
find any potential harm in the app. Following the ethical
hacking practice, we immediately removed the app from
Google Play before any user could actually download it,
as proved by the download statistic provided by Google.
Results for the other 4 RATs are not available due to the
fact that we are not authorized to submit code written by
other researchers or malicious developers.
20Submitted to Google Play under the name of SimpleFilters
Figure 8: StealthyStalker RAT app published on Google
Play under the name of SimpleFilters
CopperDroid [33] is a tool to perform dynamic anal-
ysis over Android apps to characterize the behavior of
Android malware. It automatically analyzes low-level
OS-specific and high-lelvel Android-specific behaviors
of Android malware by observing and analyzing system
call invocations, including IPC and RPC interactions,
carried out as system calls. Although CopperDroid is
a powerful tool that dynamically analyzes Android apps,
analysis results do not provide any hint on the malicious-
ness of a given sample. Indeed, by manually analyzing
the logs files generated by CopperDroid (e.g, syscalls,
pcap, logcat and basicbinder), we were not able to iden-
tify evidence of malice for the analyzed software.
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D Summary of selected Results from our User Study and Aware Evaluation
Demographic Mobile Platform Usage Participants Concerned about Personal Privacy
Total Participants 74 Smartphones 99% When using Mobile Platfotm 43%
18-19 6% Tablets 54% When using third-party Apps 57%
20-29 76% Wearables 10% When using Platform’s Camera 62%Age
30-39 18% Android OS 57% When using Platform’s Microphone 55%
International Students 70% Apple iOS 42%
Nationalities 25 Other OS 1% Participants’ Awareness about RAT Operations
Non Computer Science Major’s 75% Stealthy accesses to Platform’s Camera 56%
Major/Minor’s Degrees 34 Security Behavior Stealthy accesses to Platform’s Microphone 56%
Avoid downloading apps from unofficial App Stores 78% Knew about Dendroid or SoundComber 4%
Threats Identification without Aware Use a mobile anti-malware product 24% Knew about Krysanec or PlaceRaider 3%
Participants identifying Attack A1 36%
Participants identifying Attack A2 0% Threats Identification with Aware Aware Effectiveness and Usability
Participants identifying Attack A3 1% Participants identifying Attack A1 82% Stealthy Accesses Blocked 100%
Participants identifying Attack A4 0% Participants identifying Attack A2 76% User-Initiated Operations Hijacks Prevented 82%
Rated Aware more secure than Original OS 90%
Rated Aware as usable as the Original OS 80%
Prefer Aware Gesture to Access Prompts on Screen 57%
Demographic Distribution of Human Subjects participating in the Study
Major/Minor’s Degree Distribution of Human Subjects participating in the Study
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